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REVIEW ESSAY
Mary Kay Temple
Inventions: Writing, Textuality, and Understanding in Literary History, by 
Gerald Bruns. Yale, 1982. 210 + xiv pages.
G e r a l d  B r u n s  B e g in s  Inventions with two disclaimers. He declares in the 
Preface that the book “is not a history o f interpretation” because “This 
history cannot be written; it can only be studied. It is too vast for any one 
scholar to com prehend it.” Less directly, he warns his readers not to expect 
a tone of passionate engagement with the modest admission: “It is, of course, 
difficult to speak before an audience who wants its criticism in the form of 
methodological com bat.” In other words, Bruns is warning us to expect an 
easy way out o f a difficult subject, and the extent to which he writes up to 
his threat is the extent to which the book fails; the extent to which he reneges 
on his promise is the book’s success.
The success o f Inventions is in that, while Bruns refuses to write a full-scale 
history o f interpretation, he uses the skeletal outline of such a history to 
structure the book. In the next chapter he follows the outline of the ideal 
curriculum sketched by Frye in The Anatomy of Criticism: he begins with the 
Bible and the Q u’ran as examples o f texts with a well-known history of what 
he calls interpretation, that which is written to be read aloud, taught, preached, 
between the lines o f an existing text. He goes on to describe the relationship 
between texts in a manuscript culture, in which the very flexibility o f the 
form in which works were transmitted, a mortal handwriting rather than a 
fixed and forbidding type, physically invited the copyist’s own interference. 
Again Bruns takes a well-known example: Chaucer’s radical recasting of 
Boccaccio’s Filostrato to create Troilus and Criseyde. For the chapter on Des­
cartes he shows us what his own interlinear interpretation looks like. Why 
he does not choose Descartes’ m ore “literary” predecessor in solipsism, 
Montaigne, becomes clear only later in the book. Bruns continues his chro­
nology into the nineteenth century with what is one o f the strongest chapters 
o f the book, a reading o f Pride and Prejudice that explains why Austen is what 
we know she is, one o f the most compelling writers in English even while 
she refuses to follow Mark Twain’s dictum: “Bring on the old lady and let
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her scream!” In this case, the old lady is all the characters in a conversation 
piece in which the dialogue itself remains unreported in favor of the real 
subject o f the visit at Lambton:
The odd thing here is that very little narrative is devoted to the visit as such: we are told 
nothing, or virtually nothing, o f  anything anyone says. What takes place takes place as 
if in silence or as if in secret, yet not quite silently or secretly. The real subject never 
reaches the level or condition o f  something actually spoken, but neither is this subject 
an inward, private, or psychological affair. Things take place beneath the surface o f  words 
and action and explicit behavior— but the question is: What is this subsurface reality and 
how is it to be arrived at or recovered? (p. 112)
The “subsurface” created by a writer content to summarize proposals of 
marriage is that o f what is not, and should not be, said in polite society. In 
Bruns’s reading, Austen emerges as the most realistic of writers, and one 
who puts mere naturalists to shame.
The chapter which follows the one on Austen is also excellent. Bruns 
relates Gerard Manley Hopkins’ observations of nature and poetic theory 
to nineteenth-century physics in an admirably lucid discussion. The next 
chapter, which begins the “M odernist” section o f the book, would have 
profited from more examples from the subject, W.C. Williams’ Kora in Hell, 
but I suppose Bruns felt the space better occupied by a necessary, and 
fascinating, definition/description o f what an improvisation is.
The last chapter, on Joyce’s Ulysses, contains what I suspect to be the 
“secret m otto” o f Inventions: “Alas, the Jesuits taught me that the truth 
always lies side by side, never in betw een.” The truth in this chapter is the 
juxtaposed readings o f the novel by Fritz Senn and Hugh Kenner, whom 
Bruns sees as the most correct and most violently opposed o f Joyce’s critics. 
Bruns uses the example o f the muse/whore at the center of Stephen’s 
epiphany in The Portrait as an example o f how truths can lie feet to head like 
Molly and Leopold, always together and never one. I am reminded o f the 
kitchen-midden o f postwar criticism on Molly herself, a more complex case, 
in which every interpreter regarded her either as an earth-goddess/redeemer 
or his own personal cuckolder, and I wish Bruns’s common sense in this 
m atter had appeared forty years ago.
By the end o f the book, Bruns is able to assert triumphantly, “Identity is 
conferred from the outside in, not (as Cartesians suppose) from the inside 
out.” The reason he chose to confer meaning from the outside on Descartes 
is clear now, and brings me to the sense in which this book, by definition, 
fails. Bruns’s secret purpose throughout Inventions has been to discredit his 
enemies, the philosophers, by using the weapons of his own party, the 
rhetoricians, or, in a m ore traditional sense, the poets, since Bruns’s rhetori­
cian nothing affirmeth, and so never lieth. The underlying theme o f the 
book is the contrast between the two parties, which supplies what coher­
ency, other than that o f historical outline, the book possesses. It is the single 
most common m otif in the book. W hat Bruns calls “the antagonism between
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rhetoric and philosophy” is the real subject o f Inventions, and what are 
actually the most useful and interesting portions o f the book, the insights 
into individual texts which vindicate as well as dem onstrate Bruns’s method, 
read like mere by-products o f his war-reporting.
I say this book fails “by definition,” that is, because Bruns’s own definition 
o f the purpose o f his book precludes the most effective use of what ought 
to be effectual weapons. Bruns sees these weapons as those of his opponents, 
and cannot allow himself to use them. He attempts to disarm the philoso­
phers by conceding that, by their standards, the rhetoricians get nowhere: 
“But the rhetorician does not desire to get anywhere . . . .  He does not, for 
example, seek to solve problems.” But his adoption o f the persona o f rhetor 
fails, precisely because he despairs o f “certainty” and rejects the philoso­
pher’s “piety,” which could supply its lack. He does not have the talent o f 
Socrates (who also affirmed nothing), and the final result o f his skeptical 
mask is not, as he intended, to support his truths by indirection rather than 
assertion, but to spoil the tone o f the book. Rather, Inventions has no tone, 
and this creates an impression that the style itself is at fault, which it is not. 
W hen Bruns writes about something, he is quite easy to follow; when he 
writes around something, as he too often does, the book is unreadable, the 
fine ideas and insights buried under a heap o f weighty nothings.
I know that any academic who writes clearly runs the risk o f his col­
leagues’ scorn for “popularizing”; m ore seriously, he exposes himself to the 
charge of being wrong, since if no one knows what he is talking about no 
one can tell if he is right or not. For example, it is easy to find cases of 
overstatement, simplification, errors o f interpretation in so fine a work of 
historical criticism as Russell Fraser’s The Dark Ages And The Age of Gold 
(Princeton, 1973), just because Fraser defends his thesis, that the two epochs 
o f the title ought to have each others’ names, with real passion and energy, 
if not piety. But I found Fraser’s book impossible to put, or in the normal 
case o f literary criticism, throw down, while if I hadn’t taken careful notes 
on the well-hidden beauties o f Inventions, I wouldn’t rem em ber a single one. 
I am not arguing that a critic should write like Jam es Branch Cabell, but if 
any writer declares himself o f the party o f the poets, or rhetors, and forsakes 
the philosophers’ arm or (often rusty and creaking, to be sure) o f Absolute 
Truth, as Bruns claims to do here, he should make sure he uses the weapons 
o f his own side well, the weapons o f beauty and clarity and a style suited 
to the matter. By conceding too much to his enemies at the beginning, Bruns 
cripples himself before the battle begins, since his style reflects only his own 
doubts and hestitations before their weapons. He would have done better 
to leave the philosophers alone and written “A Brief Outline of the History 
o f Interpretation, With Projections As to the Future,” as the most interesting 
and useful part o f Inventions. Or he should have rem em bered the words o f 
that guerilla philosopher, who lurks around the peripheries o f the interpre­
tive camp with an eye, no doubt, to the throats o f the boys and ponies: “And 
if you cannot be saints o f knowledge, at least be its warriors.”
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